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Perhaps the most striking aspect of the currentphase of globalization is the increased impor-
tance of foreign direct investment (FDI). This is not
only true at the global level but also at the regional
level. It is clear that the process of economic integra-
tion in the European Union has boosted FDI for the
EU countries. In the field of international econom-
ics, the modeling of FDI has been high on the
research agenda in recent years and clear progress
has been made in understanding the determinants
and effects of FDI (see for instance Barba-Navaretti
and Venables (2004) for an overview). The new the-
oretical insights are, however, not always in line with
the facts. One important puzzle in this respect is pre-
cisely the fact that economic integration or, in mod-
eling terms, a fall in trade costs has been accompa-
nied by an increase in FDI. From the data we know
that so-called horizontal FDI, that is FDI undertak-
en for market size considerations, is the dominant
form of FDI, but theory tells us that a fall in trade
costs should go along with a decrease in horizontal
FDI. Lower trade costs, ceteris paribus, make it more
profitable for firms to serve foreign markets via
exports instead of setting up their own production in
these markets.
One way to solve this puzzle is to recognize that the
bulk of FDI does not take the form of greenfield
investment but, instead, takes place through cross-
border mergers & acquisitions (M&A). Tradition-
ally, the topic of M&A has belonged to the domain
of industrial organization. But research in this area
has so far not been very successful in pinpointing the
determinants of cross-border M&A and it has in par-
ticular not paid much attention to insights from
international economics as to the causes of FDI. It is
the goal of this paper to show for the case of cross-
border M&A how a “marriage” between interna-
tional economics and industrial organization can
help us improve our understanding of these impor-
tant phenomena. Based on innovative theoretical
work by Peter Neary (2003, 2004), we will illustrate
how a key insight from international economics, the
concept of comparative advantage, can be used to
improve our understanding of the main vehicle for
FDI, cross-border mergers. Our research (Brakman,
Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2005) shows that
firms from sectors in which the country under con-
sideration has a comparative advantage are bound to
be engaged in cross-border mergers. We also find
that the use of comparative advantage may help us
understand the stylized fact that mergers come in
waves. One important policy implication of our find-
ings is that more traditional analyses of the effects of
economic integration may underestimate its true
impact. If, and this is a big if, cross-border M&As
improve the efficiency of the firms concerned, eco-
nomic integration has additional welfare gains over
and above the ones (trade creation, improved
dynamic efficiency) that are commonly put forward
in the literature.
The importance of mergers & acquisitions1
As illustrated in Table 1, cross border M&As are the
main driving force behind the surge in foreign direct
investment, recently accounting for more than three
quarters of total FDI flows. This holds particularly
for developed countries, where the share has almost
reached 90 percent of the total. It should also be
noted that a high share of total M&A activity cross-
es international borders. For example, during the
period 1987 to 1999, which captures most of the so-
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1 See Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2005) as the gener-
al source of the data presented in this article.
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Cross-border M&As:
account for 90 per-
cent of developed
countries’ FDI
called fourth and fifth merger waves (see below),
cross border transactions accounted for about 25 to
30 percent of total M&A activity, both in terms of
value and the number of transactions. Again, this
holds in particular for developed countries. Accord-
ing to OECD data, the UK and the Netherlands are
the leading countries in cross-border M&As, closely
followed by Germany and France.At the peak of the
so-called fifth merger wave in the late 1990s, for
instance, cross-border M&As relative to GDP
amounted to 16.3 percent in the UK and 13.7 per-
cent in the Netherlands.
Our data
A good and extensive data source on mergers and
acquisitions is the Global Mergers and Acquisitions
database of Thomson Financial
Securities Data (Thomson, here-
after). This company gathers
information on mergers and
acquisitions exceeding one mil-
lion US dollars, its main sources
of information being financial
newspapers and specialized
agencies like Bloomberg and
Reuters. Our Thomson data set
begins in 1979 and ends in April
2005. After some preliminary investigations, we
decided to restrict our analysis to cross-border merg-
er deals in the period 1980 to early 2005 for five
active countries, varying in size and location, namely
Australia (AUS), France (FR), the Netherlands
(NL), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United
States (US). This resulted in 11,721 observations, or
about 28.5 percent of all cross border mergers and
acquisitions in the Thomson database.
As summarized in Table 2, the United States was
the most active country involved in mergers &
acquisitions (40.3 percent of the acquisitions and
43.7 percent of the targets), closely followed by the
UK (39.5 and 27.6 percent, respectively). Note that
cross-border M&A deals with acquirer and target
located in the same country are possible, for exam-
ple, when an American firm takes over another
Table 1
Cross-border M&A investment
(percent of total FDI inflows to the host countries) 
1987 to
1991 
1992 to
1994 
1995 to
1997 
1998 to
2001 
World 66.3 44.6 60.2 76.2 
Developed countries 77.5 64.9 85.4 89.0 
Developing and 
transition economies 21.9 15.5 25.8 35.7 
Source: Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004) , p.10. 
Table 2
Overview of M&As
Five countries, all sectors, 1980 to 2005
Acquirer 
 AUS FR USA UK NL Total
No. of deals 
Target AUS 562 23 388 351 26 1,350 
FR 14 223 425 608 74 1,344 
US 231 310 2,136 2,229 213 5,119 
UK 137 249 1,602 1,095 154 3,237 
NL 13 52 178 351 77 671 
Total 957 857 4,729 4,634 544 11,721 
Percent
AUS 4.8 0.2 3.3 3.0 0.2 11.5 
FR 0.1 1.9 3.6 5.2 0.6 11.5 
US 2.0 2.6 18.2 19.0 1.8 43.7 
UK 1.2 2.1 13.7 9.3 1.3 27.6 
NL 0.1 0.4 1.5 3.0 0.7 5.7 
 Total 8.2 7.3 40.3 39.5 4.6 100 
Horizontal M&As (2-digit sic level): 5,628 (48.0%) 
100% acquired in M&A 8,487 (72.4%) 
100% owned after M&A 9,007 (76.8%) 
Value of transaction (million $): mean 186.17
median 20.00 
maximum 60,286.67 
American firm that is active abroad. As indicated
in the Table, the median value of an M&A is
$20 million. Note that the distribution of the value
of deals is rather skewed. The maximum value, for
example, was more than $60 billion, resulting in an
average value per transaction of about $186 mil-
lion, much higher than the $20 million median
value. In most cases (72.4 percent), full ownership
is acquired with the transaction, or at least the
transaction leads to full ownership afterwards
(76.8 percent). Moreover, in almost 50 percent of
all cases a similar type of firm is acquired, indicat-
ing that we are dealing with horizontal M&As. For
the period 1985–2004, the average annual number
of deals for our five countries was 570 and their
annual value was $122 billion.2
Mergers & acquisitions: waves
There is an important stylized fact as to the devel-
opment of M&A activity over time: they come in
waves. Figure 1 gives an impression of the impor-
tance of the ‘wave’ phenomenon for our five coun-
tries. Since the value of the deals is measured in cur-
rent US dollars, we use the American GDP deflator
to adjust all values to constant 2004 dollars. It is
common to distinguish between five merger waves
during the 20th century, three of which are recent.
The third wave took place in the late 1960s to early
1970s, the fourth wave ran from about the mid 1980s
until 1990, and the fifth wave started around 1995
and ended in 2000 with the collapse of the “New
Economy”. The waves are illustrated in Figure 1 for
both the number of deals and
their value in the last two waves.
The first peak (of 1989) was
almost 600 deals with a value of
$110 billion. The second peak
(of 1999) was 1018 deals with a
value of $380 billion.When com-
pared to the average of the peri-
od, it is clear that the most
recent wave reached unprece-
dented levels in terms of num-
ber of deals and value. During
the fifth merger wave, European
firms engaged in a number of
(mega) M&As with the cross-
border take-over of Mannes-
mann (Germany) by Vodafone
(UK) for $172 billion in 2000 as the largest deal in
Europe to date (not included in Table 2). Merger
waves are positively correlated with increases in
share prices, price-earnings ratios, and the overall
business cycle. In terms of standard M&A motives
(see below), it is rather difficult to explain the wave
phenomenon.
Modeling difficulties
Despite the obvious quantitative importance of cross
border M&As, the reasons underlying these transac-
tions are still not well understood. Various motives
for M&As can be distinguished in general. In the
industrial organization literature two basic motives
stand out: an efficiency motive and a strategic
motive. Efficiency gains arise because takeovers
increase synergy between firms that increase
economies of scale or scope. Strategic gains arise if
M&As change the market structure and thus a com-
pany’s competitive position and profit level. The
main problems with these explanations is that they
are (i) based on partial equilibrium models, taking
demand and income levels as given, and (ii) do not
deal explicitly with cross-border M&As. This there-
fore provides a fundamental but also limited under-
standing of this form of takeover, as cross-border
mergers are related to economy-wide shocks, such as
(European) economic integration, changes in the
legal and regulatory environment, or possible asym-
metric business cycles.These factors change the posi-
tion of one country relative to another, pointing in
the direction of general equilibrium trade models
and thus in the direction of international economics.
Standard trade theory, however, is not well-equipped
to explain M&As since it often rules out strategic
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Cross-border M&As
come in waves
2 Ignoring the first four years in which the data set is incomplete.
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combines trade 
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interaction between firms.3 As argued by economists
like Peter Neary, Avinash Dixit and Joe Stiglitz, this
not only holds for the neoclassical perfect competi-
tion models, but also for the models based on
increasing returns to scale and monopolistic compe-
tition.
The Neary model
A recent theoretical model developed by Peter
Neary (2003, 2004), combines general equilibrium
trade theory with imperfect markets and strategic
behavior of firms to determine cross-border M&As.
It therefore is an attempt to combine international
economics and industrial organization. This attempt
is not only to be welcomed from the perspective of
industrial organization because it allows for the link-
age between cross-border M&As, see above, but it is
also to be welcomed from the perspective of inter-
national economics because there, as we explained in
our introduction, cross-border M&As, the main vehi-
cle for FDI, are a blind spot.
The attempt by Neary to combine general equilibri-
um trade theory with imperfect markets and strate-
gic behavior of firms is a priori a difficult one be-
cause pricing decisions of large firms not only direct-
ly affect profits, but their market (pricing) behavior
also affects national income and the real income of
their customers. Furthermore, large firms can also
influence factor prices. All these effects combined
have to be taken into consideration by firms when
making their decisions. Without going into the
details of the Neary model, the central idea can be
described with the help of the equation below, pro-
viding the gain to a foreign firm if it takes over a
domestic firm (an asterisk indicates foreign vari-
ables):
Gain =
The term A reflects the change in profits (π) of the
foreign firm when the number of domestic firms is
reduced by one (from n to n-1): less competition
increases profits. The term B reflects the price the
foreign firm has to pay for taking over the domestic
firm, as the initial owners have to be compensated
for their profit loss. Intuitively, the equation indicates
that if the foreign acquirer is more efficient than the
domestic target, the gain in profits (the term A) may
be high enough to cover the cost of a takeover (the
term B). Note, in particular, that if the domestic tar-
get firm has high costs its profit level will be low, and
so will be the cost of acquiring this firm (the term B).
Also note that the cost difference should not be too
large, because then there is no firm to take over. We
relate the cost differences between firms in this
international setting to the well-known concept of
revealed comparative advantage (see below). The
first testable hypothesis is therefore that M&As tend
to take place in sectors where the acquiring firm has
a strong comparative advantage. The Neary model is
also able to explain merger waves. Again looking at
the equation, it is evident that foreign firms prefer
other firms to move first in taking over a domestic
firm, as this increases their profits (term A) without
the need to incur the costs (term B). Using a game-
theoretic setting, Neary translates these forces into a
theory of merger waves, leading to a second testable
hypothesis.
Mergers and acquisitions and comparative 
advantage
To get a first glimpse of the empirical relevance of
the above two implications of the model, we have to
link the Thomson data set, introduced above, to
international trade data to determine a country’s
strong sectors. To do this, we identified 20 different
2-digit sectors in the data, for which the Thomson
data can be adequately linked to the trade data
(reducing the number of available observations to
3,462 M&As). For each country, each sector, and
each year we then calculated the Balassa index, an
index of (revealed) comparative advantage at the
sector level, equal to the share of a country’s exports
in a certain sector relative to that same share for a
group of reference countries (all OECD countries).
The index is a positive number, that is the higher the
stronger this particular sector is for the country in
question. If the Balassa index exceeds unity, the
country is said to have a revealed comparative ad-
vantage in that sector.
Figure 2 indicates that M&As do tend to take place
in strong export sectors by comparing the share of
sectors where the Balassa index exceeds unity in
case of a merger or takeover with a relevant stan-
dard or benchmark distribution. For the period 1980
to 2000, the latter shows the share of the 20 sector-
3 See, for example, the contributions of Peter Neary, Avinash Dixit
and Joe Stiglitz in: Brakman and Heijdra (2004).
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year-country observations with
a Balassa index higher than
one. For example, the first col-
umn indicates that for all coun-
tries, all years, and all sectors
32.2 percent of the observa-
tions were larger than 1 (676
out of 2,100 observations). We
do the same for the acquirer
and the target in case of a
merger or takeover. In each
case, we determined whether
or not the sector involved in a
merger or takeover had a
revealed comparative advan-
tage (Balassa index above one)
both from the acquiring firm’s
(sector-country-year) and the target firm’s (sector-
country-year) perspective.As Figure 2 illustrates, for
all mergers and acquisitions taken together, the
acquiring firm was active in a sector with a revealed
comparative advantage for more than 50 percent of
the observations, significantly more often than in
the benchmark case. Figure 2 clearly illustrates that
M&As tend to take place in strong export sectors,
with up to 60 percent of the cases with a revealed
comparative advantage for the United States. In our
underlying analysis (Brakman, Garretsen, and van
Marrewijk, 2005) we show that these first indica-
tions of Figure 2 are confirmed by more rigorous
testing. The same holds true for the idea that cross-
border mergers occur in waves, recall Figure 1. In
particular we find that:
• Australia, France, and The Netherlands, other
things being equal, are less active in cross-border
mergers & acquisitions than the UK and the USA.
• Mergers and acquisitions are undertaken by
‘strong’ firms, that is firms active in sectors with a
revealed comparative advantage as measured by
the Balassa index, in accordance with the first
hypothesis that follows from Neary’s model.
• Waves play an important role in cross-border
merger and acquisitions, this is also in accordance
with the Neary model and sector-waves occur
with a two-year horizon.
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